Russia’s exploitation of children in the war in Ukraine

Jenna Dolecek
Head of Crimes Against Children Unit at OSINT for Ukraine
jennadolecek@gmail.com

In June 2025, The Guardian reported that Russia was soliciting Ukrainian children and young adults through Telegram to carry out paid tasks.^[1] The ‘work’ included taking photos of buildings or certain areas, planting backpack bombs and suicide bombings.

Numerous children and young adults have been contacted by Russian operatives through Telegram.^[2] These operatives exploit children from low-income families and those desperate for work, as there are few opportunities in the Russian occupied areas in Ukraine.^[3] Operatives advertise on channels dedicated to posting work opportunities for Ukrainians. Individuals either respond to a post or are contacted directly, as their username and/or phone number can become visible by joining a channel. The operative then describes the task and payment. Sometimes, individuals get partial payment upfront and the rest once the task is complete and others receive payment only after the task has been completed. Partial payment comes with larger, more complex tasks, for example, if travel is involved.

For example, between February and May 2025, children aged 15 and 17 were solicited^[4] through Telegram by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). These children were tasked with bombing a train station in Ivano-Frankivsk. The bomb went off prematurely killing one boy and injuring the other. On another occasion, a 15- and 16-year-old were recruited to provide air defence surveillance meant to aid in coordinating air strikes and arson attacks.^[5] These two were intercepted by Ukrainian officials in Kharkiv.

A 19-year-old named Oleh found himself in a similar situation. Oleh saw a job advertisement and contacted the poster, who then relayed details of the task: pick up a backpack with a paint can and spray paint the outside of the police station in Rivne.^[6] Oleh opened the backpack, against his instructions, and saw that it contained a crude bomb. He immediately went to the nearest police station where he was arrested by Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) officers. Granted, Oleh is one year outside of being considered a child by human rights and humanitarian law and therefore does not fall under the category of crimes against children. However, his story serves as an example of the threats children and young adults are facing and how they are being exploited by Russian forces in the conflict.

A chilling tactic is Russian military and FSB officers enticing children to participate in activities under the guise of scavenger hunts or ‘quests’.^[7] This gamification, as well as the promise of money, speaks to children, who may not understand the consequences of their actions, or who are too desperate to give it much thought. This method of child exploitation demonstrates Russia’s willingness to manipulate, lie to, and even sacrifice, children.

Russia has also been tricking children into carrying out suicide bombings.^[8] A 15-year-old girl was coerced into carrying out a suicide bombing and luckily, she was intercepted by Ukrainian authorities and the bomb was replaced with a dummy device. In a similar situation, a 14-year-old girl was recruited to carry out a suicide bombing.^[9] However, rather than incentivising her with the promise of payment or reward, the FSB hacked her phone and blackmailed her with her own explicit photos. This case intersects with sexual and gender-based crimes, as targeting minors and threatening them with their own photos weaponises sex and sexuality against children.

The exploitation of children through financial incentives, blackmail, or other coercion, is an extremely concerning trend. The SSU reported that 25 per cent of those arrested for espionage were children under the age of 18.^[10] In one instance, the SSU detained five children aged between 14 to 15^[11] Additionally, the SSU mentioned that more than a half of those coerced by the FSB into working for Russia are unemployed or struggling with addictions, providing insight as to why children may become involved in these activities.

The ICC’s arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova,^[12] cover limited patterns of unlawful deportation and forcible transfer under the Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii)^[13] and only from the Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. Russian crimes against children go beyond their deportation and forcible transfer.

These solicitation tactics can potentially amount to the war crime of using children to actively participate in hostilities under the Rome Statute Article 8(2)(e)(vii). In the Lubanga judgement section X(A)(2)(b), the ICC Trial Chamber took a broad interpretation of law when it comes to children in conflict.^[14] The discussion largely hinged upon whether or not certain activities performed by children qualified as direct participation or active participation in military activities linked to conflict. Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute says: ‘Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities’. This includes using children for scouting, spying, sabotage, as couriers, and so on.^[15] The court decided that activities in direct relation to a conflict, but not on the front lines, can qualify as using children to participate actively in hostilities, therefore violating the Rome Statute.

Further, it can also amount to the crime against humanity of any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity under Article 7(1)(g). The ICC’s Policy on Gender-Based Crimes^[16] further elaborates on what may constitute sexual violence in paragraph 62, which could be the case of the 15 year girl whose photos were used against her.

Moreover, Ivano-Frankivsk, where a bomb detonated prematurely injuring one boy and killing another, is in western Ukraine near Lviv, which is not an occupied area. Neither is Chernihiv, where the 15-year-old girl was to carry out a suicide bombing. Not only are the arrest warrant’s charges insufficient but so is the territorial jurisdiction, as children outside of the occupied areas are being targeted.

These crimes against Ukrainian children may also amount to additional war crimes listed in the Rome Statute under Article 8(2)(a)(v) – war crime of compelling service in hostile forces and/or Article 8(2)(b)(xv) – war crime of compelling participation in military operations. This ties to humanitarian law as they could also violate Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV)^[17] for ‘physical or moral coercion’. The ICRC Commentary of 1958 further explains that, ‘coercion is forbidden for any purpose or motive whatever’.^[18] The prohibition of coercion not only applies to those in occupied territories, but to all protected persons.

In addition to coercion, GC IV Article 51 may come into play as, ‘protected persons may not be compelled to undertake any work which would involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations’.^[19] According to the ICRC Commentary of 1958,^[20] an argument could be made given that: ‘[a]ny action on the part of the Occupying Power which had the effect of involving them, directly or indirectly, in the fighting and so preventing them from benefiting by special protection under the [Fourth Geneva] Convention must be regarded as unlawful’. For Oleh and the children who carried out Russian tasks, this would be a violation by way of indirectly making adults or children take part in military operations causing them to lose their protected status.

Additional Protocol I outright prohibits children participating in conflict. Article 77(2) states: ‘[p]arties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces’.^[21] The age of 15 is the international standard by which children are allowed to voluntarily participate in conflict but not be forcibly recruited.

In summation, not only do Russia’s actions violate numerous articles of the Rome Statute and Geneva Conventions, but nearly every relevant human rights consideration. Not to mention, the entirety of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Russia ratified in 1990. Involving children in conflict in any way at any time is an affront to human rights and the protection of civilians. Yet, Russia continues to find new ways to put children at risk in order to gain an advantage in the conflict in Ukraine.

Notes

^[1] See www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/30/russia-pays-ukrainians-suicide-bombers-shadow-war-you-now?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] See Hanna Sokolova-Stekh at www.dw.com/en/in-ukraines-occupied-luhansk-many-struggling-to-get-by/a-73585747.

^[4] See The New York Times at www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/europe/ukraine-russia-teenagers-sabotage.html.

^[5] Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). David Kirichenko, ‘Terrorism’s Future — Crypto for Russia’s Suicide Bombers’ at https://cepa.org/article/terrorisms-future-crypto-for-russias-suicide-bombers.

^[6] See n 1 above.

^[7] See Christopher Miller, Financial Review, ‘Child traitors: How Russia grooms Ukrainian teens as spies, saboteurs’ at www.afr.com/world/europe/child-traitors-how-russia-grooms-ukrainian-teens-as-spies-saboteurs-20250630-p5mbfh.

^[8] See n 5 above.

^[9] See TVP World: https://tvpworld.com/86206446/ukraine-says-it-detained-nine-recruited-by-russia-to-carry-out-bombings.

^[10] See n 7 above.

^[11] See n 9 above.

^[12] International Criminal Court (ICC) Press Release 17 March 2023: www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.

^[13] ICC Rome Statute available at www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf.

^[14] ICC, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (‘the Lubanga case”) at www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF.

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] See www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2023-12/2023-policy-gender-en-web.pdf.

^[17] Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949?activeTab=1949GCs-APs-and-commentaries.

^[18] See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-31/commentary/1958.

^[19] See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51?activeTab=.

^[20] See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51/commentary/1958?activeTab=.

^[21] See https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-77?activeTab=.