Accountability for environmental war crimes: the Ukrainian experience

Ukraine has become a trailblazer in addressing environmental war crimes. We decided to set a precedent of criminal responsibility for wartime environmental damage.

Environmental war crimes became part of Ukraine’s broader accountability architecture (web of accountability) aimed at addressing atrocity crimes committed during Russia’s aggression.

Within the Specialised Environmental Prosecutor’s Office (SEPO) of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) I have decided to establish a dedicated unit on environmental crimes resulting from Russian aggression against Ukraine.

We ensured a close internal coordination of this unit with the War Crimes Department of the PGO, regional prosecution offices, and external coordination with relevant governmental agencies, the Security Service of Ukraine, National Police investigators, environmental inspectors, scientists, technical experts.

We have also developed a close cooperation and exchange of data with civil society organisations. Interagency Working Group named as International Council of Experts became a platform for cooperation between prosecutors and more than 25 local and foreign NGOs with an expertise in documenting wartime environmental damage and international humanitarian law.

This is not theoretical work — it is a fully operational accountability system where the natural environment is treated as a victim.

This approach later became one of the core principles reflected in the Environmental Compact for Ukraine developed by the High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of War established by the Office of the President of Ukraine. I was a member of this high-level working group which brought together leading international experts and ensured that environmental accountability became part of Ukraine’s broader strategy.

The Environmental Compact for Ukraine defined three core pillars: documenting environmental damage, ensuring accountability, and enabling green reconstruction.

Ukraine therefore became one of the first countries in modern history to systematically investigate wartime environmental destruction during an active and still ongoing aggression.

Environmental harm caused by Russia is widespread and systematic, long-term and often irreversible. It is transboundary in nature.

Thousands of incidents of environmental damage have already been recorded across Ukraine. More than 25 per cent of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war. Sixteen Ramsar sites have already suffered disruption of their ecological status, while many others remain under threat. According to current assessments, the total environmental damage caused by Russia’s aggression has already reached approximately UAH 6.76 trillion, or EUR 131.6 billion.

The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam by Russian armed forces on 6 June 2023 is one of the largest environmental disasters in Europe in decades:

• 610 km² flooded area, affecting 80 settlements and causing 35 deaths
• The Kakhovka Reservoir – the biggest reservoir in Europe, an Emerald network site, was almost completely drained
• Severe and long-term impact on the ecosystem (national parks, wetlands, etc).

According to the Rapid Environmental Assessment conducted by the United Nations Environment Programme, the breach of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 is a far-reaching environmental disaster that goes beyond Ukraine’s borders; the magnitude of which might not be clear for years or even decades to come.

Yet environmental war crimes in Ukraine are not limited to large-scale ecological destruction alone. Some of the most alarming cases concern attacks on nuclear infrastructure and the deliberate creation of radiological risks.

Today, Ukrainian prosecutors are investigating approximately 268 criminal proceedings under Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine concerning violations of the laws and customs of war involving environmental damage. These proceedings cover nearly 500 separate episodes.

In addition, prosecutors are investigating at least 10 proceedings under Article 441 concerning ecocide.

Several environmental war crimes cases are already before Ukrainian courts, including the recent judgment concerning the unlawful appropriation of rare animals from the occupied Askania-Nova biosphere reserve.

Importantly, Ukraine’s experience demonstrated that environmental destruction during war cannot be separated from broader systems of economic, infrastructure and security governance. And nowhere is this more visible than in the area of nuclear infrastructure.

Category one: Attacks against nuclear facilities

Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology

One of the earliest and most significant examples concerns the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, a nuclear research facility repeatedly attacked by Russian forces. Ukrainian prosecutors documented 74 strikes against the facility, with estimated damages reaching approximately 15 billion hryvnias.

These attacks formed the basis for one of the first wartime ecocide investigations connected to attacks on nuclear infrastructure.

The significance of this case was not limited to physical destruction. The central issue was the deliberate creation of risks capable of producing catastrophic environmental consequences extending far beyond the immediate military context.

The Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine has issued the first notice of suspicion for the crime of ecocide to a Russian General for attacks on the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology combined with the charges on aggression and the war crime. This case is on a trial stage now.

Chornobyl: occupation, looting and the 2025 Shahed attack

The occupation of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and exclusion zone in February and March 2022 demonstrated another dangerous dimension of modern warfare.

Russian military forces occupied the territory of the plant, deployed troops and military equipment inside the exclusion zone and effectively transformed one of the world’s most sensitive nuclear sites into an active military zone.

Occupation was accompanied by systematic looting and destruction.

Ukrainian investigations established damage and appropriation involving not only the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant itself, but also the Chornobyl Radiation and Ecological Biosphere Reserve, radioactive waste enterprises, scientific infrastructure and environmental monitoring facilities. The documented damage exceeded one billion hryvnias.

Investigators identified involvement of senior Russian military officials, Rosgvardia representatives and persons connected to Rosatom structures.

Even after de-occupation, the risks continued.

On 14 February 2025, a Shahed-136 drone struck the New Safe Confinement structure covering reactor unit 4 at Chornobyl.

The strike damaged the outer cladding of the confinement structure and technical systems inside the facility. Ukrainian investigators immediately conducted radiological measurements, engineering examinations, explosive analysis and environmental assessments. Fragments recovered at the site were identified as components of a Shahed-136 drone. Fortunately, radiation levels remained stable.

Following the 14 February 2025 Shahed-136 strike, the damage to the New Safe Confinement required emergency repairs and is expected to cost at least tens of millions of euros, potentially hundreds of millions. France alone announced an initial €10 million contribution for urgent works. In December 2025, the IAEA confirmed that the New Safe Confinement had lost its primary safety functions, including its confinement capability, while radiation levels remained stable.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant represents one more alarming example. For the first time in history, a major operating nuclear power plant – the biggest in Europe – remains under foreign military occupation during an active war.

Ukrainian investigations established evidence concerning the participation of representatives of the Russian political leadership, military command and Rosatom structures in the unlawful seizure and attempted appropriation of the plant.

The investigations concern the unlawful disconnection of the plant from the Ukrainian energy system, attempts to integrate it into Russian-controlled structures, pressure on Ukrainian personnel and the militarisation of the facility itself.

The occupation of Zaporizhzhia is not only a Ukrainian issue. It is not simply a violation of international humanitarian law. It is an attempt to normalise the idea that nuclear infrastructure may operate under military coercion and foreign occupation. If accepted, this would fundamentally undermine decades of global nuclear governance architecture.

It is a direct challenge to the global nuclear governance system. If the international community allows the operation of nuclear facilities under military occupation to become normalised, this creates a precedent with consequences extending far beyond Europe.

This is precisely why Ukraine recently initiated outreach to operators and executives of nuclear power plants around the world in support of a simple principle: no nuclear power plant should ever operate under military occupation.

Category two: Pillage of natural resources in occupied territories

Yet environmental war crimes in Ukraine are not limited to attacks creating radiological risks. Another major dimension of the war concerns the systematic exploitation of occupied territories and natural resources.

This aspect of the war often receives less public attention internationally, yet it demonstrates very clearly how environmental destruction, economic exploitation and international commerce intersect during modern armed conflict.

Russia’s occupation model is not only military. It is extractive.

Occupied territories are systematically integrated into Russian-controlled economic systems involving grain, coal, industrial assets, energy infrastructure and mineral resources.

Grain and agricultural infrastructure

One of the clearest examples concerns the seizure and export of Ukrainian grain from occupied territories.

Investigations conducted together with partners, documented organised systems involving appropriation of grain elevators, occupation of agricultural infrastructure, control over transport routes and export operations through occupied territories and Russian logistics networks.

These activities may amount to pillage and unlawful appropriation of property under international humanitarian law.

But they also raise broader questions highly relevant to the international legal and business community. They concern sanctions compliance, environmental, social and governance obligations, supply-chain due diligence and commodity tracing.

The question is whether international markets are capable of identifying and preventing the circulation of commodities originating from unlawful occupation and exploitation.

Coal from occupied territories of Ukraine

The same applies to coal extracted from occupied territories of Donbas.

Ukrainian criminal investigations documented organised schemes involving illegal coal extraction in occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions followed by transportation through Russian logistics routes and exports to foreign jurisdictions.

The investigations identified occupation-controlled mining enterprises, intermediary companies registered in Russia, contracts involving entities in third countries, transportation through Russian ports and international shipping arrangements involving deliveries to foreign markets.

These are not isolated acts of wartime looting. They are structured economic systems connected to occupation. And this creates important questions for the legal profession globally.

How should traders, insurers, intermediaries and commodity markets verify the origin of resources extracted from occupied territories?

How should sanctions and compliance mechanisms adapt to wartime resource exploitation?

And how can international markets avoid becoming mechanisms for laundering pillaged resources originating from occupied territories?

Ukraine is confronting these questions in practice today.

One important lesson from Ukraine’s experience is that environmental accountability today requires highly multidisciplinary cooperation.

Modern investigations increasingly rely on satellite imagery, geospatial analysis, environmental expertise, engineering assessments, digital evidence, OSINT and financial tracing.

Environmental war crimes investigations now sit at the intersection of criminal law, environmental law, infrastructure governance, sanctions, energy regulation and international commerce.

This means that the work of prosecutors increasingly overlaps with the work of lawyers advising:

• energy companies;
• infrastructure operators;
• commodity traders;
• mining companies;
• insurers;
• regulators;
• and investors.

The legal questions created by Russian aggression against Ukraine are therefore not limited to criminal accountability alone.

They increasingly concern due diligence, supply-chain verification, ESG frameworks, sanctions enforcement, infrastructure resilience and corporate risk management.

International impact: Ukraine is shaping global practice

Ukraine’s work has:

• Triggered global discussions on recognising ecocide as international crime
• Catalysed the launch by ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan of a new policy initiative in February 2024 to advance accountability for environmental crimes and
• Contributed to the adoption in December 2025 of the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor’s Policy on Addressing Environmental Damage Through the Rome Statute
• Been acknowledged by the UN Secretary-General: The UN Secretary-General in 2024 has recognised Ukraine as one of the first countries to investigate environmental destruction in war as possible ecocide — and has highlighted the urgent need to strengthen international law in this area.

Together with partners (Climate Counsel), the PGO prepared the Guide to Identifying and Framing Environmental War Crimes in Ukraine. Ukraine is now a case study of the application of IHL in the field of accountability for wartime environmental damage.

International cooperation and the role of the IBA

This is precisely why the support of the International Bar Association has been so important.

I would like to express particular appreciation to the IBA and SEERIL not simply for political solidarity with Ukraine, but for practical and professional support that helped strengthen prosecutorial capacity on the ground.

The environmental crimes training programmes organised by the IBA in Rzeszów in 2024 and 2026 became an important operational international platform dedicated specifically to prosecuting environmental war crimes during an ongoing armed conflict.

These trainings addressed highly practical challenges including evidence admissibility, open-source intelligence, command responsibility, attacks on dams, destruction of agricultural systems, attacks on energy infrastructure, nuclear risks, pillage and environmental forensic methodologies.

What began as support for Ukraine is increasingly helping shape global practice for future conflicts.

Call to action: nuclear safety, due diligence and accountability

Ladies and gentlemen,

The legal community has an important role to play in ensuring that environmental destruction and exploitation during war do not become normalised and go unpunished.

This includes support for the principle that no nuclear power plant should ever operate under military occupation.

It also includes strengthening due diligence mechanisms capable of identifying grain, coal and other resources originating from occupied territories.

International markets must not become mechanisms for laundering pillaged resources extracted during armed conflict.

And the legal frameworks governing international commerce, sanctions and corporate compliance must evolve accordingly.