Ethiopia and Maritime law without a coastline: recent legal and diplomatic developments (2024-2026)

Ms Tsedey Girma Mengistu
Associate, BonelliErede, Ethiopia
tsedey.girma@belex.com

Introduction

Although Ethiopia has remained landlocked since 1993, maritime law has re-emerged as a particularly dynamic domain within its recent legal and diplomatic agenda. Between 2024 and 2026, the country has undertaken a series of notable and unprecedented initiatives addressing port access, maritime security, and the legal rights of landlocked states under international law. These developments have generated significant interest among maritime law scholars and practitioners, particularly with regard to access regimes, sovereignty claims, treaty interpretation, and broader implications for regional stability in the Horn of Africa.

Current discourse reflects a marked shift from a traditionally functional, logistics-oriented approach toward a more assertive pursuit of sovereign access to the Red Sea. This evolving position has prompted important legal and policy debates, including whether landlocked states may lawfully secure sovereign port arrangements without conflict, and how existing international maritime frameworks – particularly those governing the rights of landlocked states – apply in contemporary geopolitical contexts.

Ethiopia's maritime legal framework is built upon four key legislative pillars that balance foundational law with modern regulatory and logistics needs. The cornerstone is the Maritime Code of Ethiopia (1960), which governs fundamental aspects such as ship registration, liabilities, the carriage of goods, and marine insurance. Institutional oversight is established by the Maritime Sector Administration Proclamation No 549/2007, which created the Ethiopian Maritime Authority to regulate transport operations and enhance the efficiency of import and export transit times. To address modern supply chain complexities, the Multimodal Transport of Goods Proclamation heavily regulates operators carrying cargo across various transport modes – like ships, trucks, and trains – under a single, unified contract. Finally, the sector guarantees international labour compliance through the Ratification of Maritime Labour Proclamation No 1063/2017, which fully integrates the Maritime Labour Convention (the ‘MLC 2006’) to ensure decent working and living conditions for seafarers.

This article highlights the most salient recent developments and considers their implications for the interpretation and application of international maritime law, as well as for ongoing diplomatic relations in the region.

The Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (January 2024)

In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, a self-declared but internationally unrecognised entity, marking a significant development in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. The agreement, signed on 1 January 2024 by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi, provides Ethiopia with long-term access to a stretch of coastline along the Gulf of Aden. Specifically, the MoU grants Addis Ababa a lease of approximately 19–20 kilometres of coastal territory for a period of up to 50 years, enabling both commercial maritime activities and the potential establishment of a naval presence.

In return, Somaliland is expected to receive a significant political concession: a prospective commitment from Ethiopia to formally recognise its independence. Such recognition would be unprecedented, as Somaliland – despite maintaining de facto autonomy since 1991 – has not been officially recognised by any United Nations member state. The agreement therefore represents a strategic exchange, with Ethiopia seeking secure access to the sea while Somaliland pursues long-awaited international legitimacy.

This development must be understood within Ethiopia’s broader strategic objective of regaining direct access to maritime routes, following the loss of its coastline after Eritrea’s independence in 1993. The MoU reflects Addis Ababa’s efforts to reduce its heavy reliance on Djibouti for port services and to expand its strategic and economic reach in the region. At the same time, the agreement has generated significant regional tension, particularly with Somalia, which strongly rejects Somaliland’s claim to independence and considers the deal a violation of its sovereignty.

Besides the lack of an official document that was made public and the different accounts of government officials, this ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between Ethiopia and Somaliland has been challenged by international law experts on the right of sea access.

Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether the MoU truly conflicts with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 125 of the Convention explicitly provides that landlocked states, such as Ethiopia, have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights recognised under the Convention, including those related to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. This right applies through all means of transport.

However, the Convention specifies that the terms and modalities governing the exercise of this freedom of transit are to be determined through agreements between the landlocked state and the relevant transit state(s). It is important to emphasise that, while UNCLOS leaves these practical arrangements to the parties involved, it does not grant transit or coastal states the authority to determine whether a landlocked state may exercise its right of access to the sea.

Furthermore, Article 124 defines ‘transit states’ as any state, whether coastal or not, that is geographically situated between a landlocked state and the sea, and through whose territory transit traffic must pass. This definition reinforces the idea that transit status is determined by geography rather than political discretion.

Accordingly, the key issue that must be examined is which political entity controls the transit corridor between Ethiopia and the Gulf of Aden. In addressing this question, it is essential to assess whether that entity qualifies as a state under international law. Such an evaluation must be grounded in the established criteria for statehood, particularly the elements outlined in international legal standards, and determine whether the entity possesses these attributes to justify recognition as a sovereign state.

Ethiopia’s quest for Red Sea access and recent maritime agreement between Egypt and Eritrea

Ethiopia is the most populous landlocked country in the world and has repeatedly revived its claim to access a Red Sea port based on three main arguments: historical and legal rights, the needs of national development, and its international standing. According to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the absence of a maritime outlet is an ‘existential’ issue for Ethiopia’s role in Africa.

Currently, Ethiopia relies heavily on the port of Djibouti, which handles more than 95 per cent of its imports and exports. This dependence costs the country over US$1bn annually, a burden the cash-strapped economy can hardly sustain. Addressing parliament, Abiy Ahmed emphasised that ‘a population of over 120 million people cannot remain landlocked’ and that the current generation should not pass on a geographically constrained nation to future generations.1

Before Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia had direct access to the Red Sea through the ports of Massawa and Assab, which were vital links to global trade routes. The loss of Assab marked the first time in its history that Ethiopia became fully landlocked.

In contrast to Ethiopia’s renewed push for Red Sea access, Egypt and Eritrea have recently strengthened their cooperation. The two countries signed a maritime agreement following a meeting in Asmara between their foreign ministers. This agreement, which focuses on the security of African coastal states, implicitly excludes Ethiopia, reinforcing its continued lack of access to the Red Sea.2

Under international law, Eritrea’s alignment with Egypt does not inherently violate the law of the sea; coastal states retain absolute sovereignty over their maritime affairs and bear no strict legal obligation to grant port access to landlocked neighbours. However, when weighed against Ethiopia’s historical ties to the Red Sea, acute economic reliance on external ports, and critical developmental demands, such an alliance risks contradicting the cooperative spirit envisioned by UNCLOS. Should this alignment systematically isolate Ethiopia from secure, diversified maritime access, it could be interpreted as undermining the principles of equitable access, good neighbourliness, and regional cooperation.

Ultimately, this dynamic underscores the enduring friction between Ethiopia’s legal right to sea access and the geopolitical constraints that hinder its realisation. This tension raises a fundamental question regarding the underlying drivers of the impasse: is the dispute truly a consequence of a failure to achieve consensus on technical terms and operational modalities, or is it an explicit deployment of strategic maritime positioning to enforce broader political agendas?

Conclusion

In conclusion, the evolving discourse surrounding Ethiopia's maritime ambitions underscores an enduring friction between a landlocked nation’s asserted legal right to sea access and the rigid geopolitical realities that restrict its realisation. While domestic frameworks like the Maritime Code of 1960 establish a baseline for logistics and transport operations, Ethiopia's strategic pivot toward obtaining a sovereign naval and commercial foothold has fundamentally disrupted regional stability. The pursuit of the Somaliland MoU exposes profound international legal dilemmas regarding statehood and territorial sovereignty, while simultaneously prompting adversarial regional alliances, such as the recent alignment between Egypt and Eritrea. Although UNCLOS Article 125 establishes the theoretical right of access to and from the sea, it leaves the practical execution of transit modalities entirely dependent on mutual agreement between neighbouring states. As regional counter-alignments threaten to systematically isolate Ethiopia, a fundamental question remains: is the current impasse merely a failure to negotiate technical and operational terms of transit, or is it a deliberate manifestation of strategic maritime positioning utilised to enforce broader political agendas in the Horn of Africa?

Notes

1     See www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7671004, accessed 28 July 2026.

2     See www.ilriformista.it/egitto-ed-eritrea-accordo-marittimo-per-arginare-le-pretese-delletiopia-che-vuole-un-accesso-al-mar-rosso-518039, accessed 28 July 2026.