Europe takes to the streets

Representatives protest a bill before the Hungarian parliament that would ban Hungary’s annual Pride march and impose fines on organisers and people attending the event in Budapest, Hungary, 18 March 2025. REUTERS/Marton Monus
From Belgrade and Bratislava to Tbilisi, mass protests have been filling European cities. A combination of democratic backsliding and fears of a ‘pull to the East’ appear to be driving them.
In Serbia, an ‘age of the cranes’ is underway. Funds from Abu Dhabi have built a waterfront development in the capital, while Belgrade will host Expo 2027, with improvements underway in preparation. Meanwhile, a new high-speed railway connecting Hungary, Serbia and Slovakia – ultimately to link up with the Greek port of Piraeus – has been progressing with considerable input from China. As part of this project, Novi Sad’s railway station was revamped to allow for the passage of the new high-speed train. Originally built in the 1960s, the upgrade was declared open by Serbia’s President Vučić in 2022.
But in November the station’s concrete canopy collapsed, killing 16 people. The incident sparked outrage and saw over 20,000 demonstrators taking to the streets in Novi Sad as well as in Belgrade in protest at what, they allege, is the embedded corruption at the heart of the construction project that led to the collapse, and at the illiberal regime of Aleksandar Vučić more generally. Protests have continued intermittently ever since.
The Serbian government didn’t respond to Global Insight’s request for comment, but it has argued that due process is in motion. It says prosecutors acted swiftly in making arrests after the disaster, with 13 individuals indicted. ‘This is proof that no one intends to hide, cover up or obstruct anything,’ said then-Prime Minister, Miloš Vučević.
Demonstrations in the large squares of European capitals have become a recurring theme, from Freedom Square in Bratislava, to Slavija Square in Belgrade and Fovam Square in Budapest. There have also been protests in Tbilisi, Georgia, and Bucharest, Romania. No two protests are the same, and they appear to have no direct links. But they do have common threads, as exemplified by Serbia. They are a feature of – and a reaction to – countries in the region experiencing democratic backsliding and erosion of the rule of law, as parliament and the press, the courts and civil society organisations are undermined by authoritarian leadership. And, of course, it’s in situations where political opposition is stymied that protesting in the streets becomes the only option.
The war in Ukraine has played its part in acting not only as a domestically divisive issue, particularly in countries where the battlefield is alarmingly close, but also as a priority to which other issues must come second. As the EU grapples with the threat from Russia and the need to keep its Member States and regional neighbours aligned, democratic and rule of law issues within its borders are a challenge it may struggle to attend to.
Students of Serbia
In Serbia, the protests have become increasingly fraught. At the outset, students from the University of Belgrade were demanding the release of documents relating to the roof’s collapse and set up what was termed a ‘disobedient’ self-governing assembly within the institution. Latterly, the aims of the protestors have escalated to calling for snap elections. This culminated in a protest involving some 140,000 people at the end of June, blockading routes and bridges.
Vučić’s association to the train station’s renovation is symbolised by pictures of him at its re-opening, travelling on one of the new trains, alongside Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. But the causal ties are deeper. Protestors believe he has, since 2014, overseen an increasingly authoritarian regime, using his power to consolidate his own position. For example, Vučić took on the title of president, technically a figurehead position, which has put him beyond the reach of party politics. He says he took on the presidency ‘for the continuity and stability of Serbia.’
For those on the streets, Vučić’s regime has undermined the organs of the state, the regulators and the courts. Eric Gordy, Professor of Political and Cultural Sociology at University College London (UCL), explains that for the country’s myriad development projects, ‘there is no open, competitive bidding for construction companies. It is not founded on qualifications or real inspections.’
A drone view shows Serbian students and other demonstrators with mobile phone flashlights during an anti-government protest demanding snap elections at the Slavija square, in Belgrade, Serbia, 28 June 2025. REUTERS/Djordje Kojadinovic
Vučić’s power games have resulted in what’s referred to as the ‘state capture’ of democratic institutions. ‘The [roof collapse] incident really resonated with people because it made clear that anything you want access to in these “captured societies”, employment, health care and education, it’s done by informal networks of political parties,’ says Gordy.
Foreign agents everywhere
There have been protests too against a ‘foreign agents’ bill recently tabled in Serbia that’s widely seen as a legislative attempt at silencing dissent. This proposed law requires civil society organisations to register with a ministry of the government if they receive funding from abroad, with very high penalties if they don’t comply. Similar rules have been introduced or attempted in Georgia, Hungary and Slovakia. Civil liberties groups argue the registration obligations are a means of suppressing dissent and shutting down criticism of the government – and are wholly disproportionate.
In Slovakia, the proposals passed into law in May amidst widespread street demonstrations. In Hungary, in response to the introduction of a similar ‘Transparency in Public Life’ bill, protestors were seen, for example, crossing a bridge in silence with their mouths taped up. A spokesperson from the Slovakian government says such laws are needed for ‘structural transparency’ and to ‘eliminate the risks associated with money laundering and terrorist financing.’
A person holds a flag of the European Union during an anti-government protest, in Bratislava, Slovakia, 9 May 2025. REUTERS/Radovan Stoklasa
Indeed, the UK and the US do have rules for similar reasons but what’s been put in place for ‘foreign agents’ in countries such as Slovakia and Serbia are part and parcel of other legislative manoeuvres that form an alarming and authoritarian approach to power.
In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s coalition has recently passed laws limiting free assembly – which, it argues, are a necessary response ‘to the security situation’ following the attempted assassination of Fico himself in 2024 – and closed down the Special Prosecutor’s Office that was investigating members of his party. Fico described the office as ‘biased’ and said it was violating human rights. Following such developments, an estimated 30,000 to 100,000 people have been attending street rallies in Slovakia since the end of 2024 and into early 2025.
In Hungary, Orbán’s regime is well-known as an ever-increasing outlier within the EU project. Referred to as an ‘elected autocracy’ given measures such as the forced retirement of judges, public attacks on the judiciary and a lack of pluralism in the press, it was Hungary’s actions that led to the European Commission instigating annual rule of law monitoring and reporting.
A number of infringement proceedings are in motion and €18bn of EU funding remains blocked due to repeated legislative manoeuvres that, the European Commission argues, don’t support basic democratic and rule of law values.
During a recent press conference at the Hungarian Embassy in London, the country’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Levente Magyar, argued that the European Commission ‘has been operating on a political basis […] encroaching on our rights and freedoms, and on policies that we did not sign up to when we joined the EU.’
Hungary does, these days, appear to have a viable opposition leader, Péter Magyar, who’s President of the Tisza (Freedom and Respect) Party. Perhaps this has helped to embolden ordinary Hungarians to fill the streets. A Pride march was held in June, attended by thousands of supporters and with a broad anti-government agenda. ‘This is not only about LGBTQ protections,’ one protestor said in a video interview. ‘This is our last moment to stand up for our rights.’
Trouble in Tbilisi
Beyond the cities of the River Danube and across the Black Sea, intense demonstrations have been seen in Georgia, most recently since October when people filled the squares of Tbilisi following allegedly rigged elections. The incumbent Georgia Dream Party, which had already been in office for two terms, won 54 per cent of the vote. Allegations of voter intimidation ensued, which were denied by the Georgia Dream Party. Although, to date, there’s no concrete evidence of electoral fraud, what happened next led to protests on an even greater scale.
As the fraud allegations and political volatility escalated, a resolution was passed in the EU Parliament in November rejecting the Georgian results and calling for the country to run fresh elections in 2025. In response, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced that his government would suspend plans for EU accession. This decision led to an estimated 100,000 demonstrators marching in the streets. ‘Most people here believe that the key to their own security is with the EU,’ says Vano Gogelia, Council Member for Georgia on the IBA European Regional Forum, who speaks in a personal capacity. ‘It has been an aspiration for many years, and they feel this is being taken from them.’
As in other countries, these protests took place in the context of what Gogelia calls ‘a cascade of anti-democratic initiatives’. In 2024, the Georgian government introduced the same restrictions on ‘foreign agents’ now seen in Slovakia. ‘It’s the same playbook as in other illiberal countries,’ says Gogelia. ‘It’s all about clamping down on your critics and preventing foreign interference. The word “agent” has connotations of “spy” here. The Russians have introduced the same laws.’ The Georgian government didn’t respond to Global Insight’s request for comment.
In December, following the huge demonstrations, the ruling party introduced increased fines for the blocking of roads to around 5,000 lari – a significant sum. New rules around the use of fireworks and wearing masks during protests were also introduced. ‘These measures all have a chilling effect on the people who want to protest against the backsliding from EU integration,’ says Gogelia.
A ‘pull to the East’
Protestors in these countries have also voiced fears of being ‘pulled to the East’, as Martin Provazník, Council Member for Slovakia on the IBA European Regional Forum, terms it. This refers to a country turning towards Russia and away from the West and the EU. In Slovakia, for example, approximately 100,000 people came out to protest in several towns within days of Fico visiting Moscow. The Slovakian government didn’t respond to Global Insight’s request for comment on this subject.
Reliable information is a problem in our region now […] there is a real concern about misinformation from Russia
Martin Provazník
Council Member for Slovakia, IBA European Regional Forum
There are multiple concerns about Russian influence in the region, in respect of elections and social media, for instance. ‘Reliable information is a problem in our region now. It is hard to pinpoint but there is a real concern about misinformation from Russia,’ says Provazník. There have also been protests in support of a pro-Russian position, with Bucharest witnessing violent scenes in March as the ‘pro-Russian’ candidate, Calin Georgescu, was barred from running in Romania’s presidential election by the country’s Constitutional Court.
Law enforcement officers stand guard opposite road blockades organised by students and anti-government demonstrators demanding snap elections and the release of arrested protestors, in Belgrade, Serbia, 3 July 2025. REUTERS/Amir Hamzagic
For the pro-EU camp, there’s bad news too from Poland, where the conservative candidate Karol Nawrocki won the country’s presidential election in June. Nawrocki is backed by the Law & Justice party, who were formerly in power in Poland and who introduced a number of controversial reforms that opponents say diminished the rule of law. The current Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, has been attempting to roll these reforms back, but Nawrocki may now be a thorn in the side of Tusk’s government. ‘Under Poland’s rules, the president has considerable constitutional powers of veto. Tusk may now have little room for manoeuvre,’ says Aleks Szczerbiak, Professor of Politics at Sussex University.
This pull to the East was crystallised by the war in Ukraine and the conflict leaves the EU to face the dual challenge of ‘backsliding’ amongst its own members and a real and present threat on its borders. The European Commission has attempted to engage with concerns through its Annual Rule of Law Report, as well as via infringement proceedings and rule of law-related funding conditions. But it faces criticism that this isn’t enough. ‘There needs to be stronger oversight and active use of the rule of law protection tools it has […] in these times of fast-depleting democracies,’ says Tahera Mandviwala, Member of the IBA Rule of Law Forum Advisory Board. The European Commission didn’t provide comment in response to Global Insight’s request.
The EU, so far, has taken a more realpolitik approach. Within its membership, it’s forced to work with the authoritarian governments of Fico and Orbán to garner the support it needs in Ukraine. Outside of the perimeter of its Member States, the EU has, according to Bojan Aleksov, Associate Professor in Balkan History at UCL, chosen to seek out allies who will steer a steady ship regardless of their internal politics. ‘The EU agenda has been to prioritise stability over democracy, to foster a “stabilitocracy” on the EU’s borders,’ he says.
Ire in Istanbul
And the EU must take stability where it can find it. In an increasingly volatile world, this is much harder to do. Bordering Georgia to the north and the EU to the west is Turkey, where relations with the latter are becoming increasingly complex. The arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoğlu – who’s considered the primary potential opponent to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – in March was the catalyst for protest in Turkey too. Imamoğlu was arrested on corruption charges, which Turkey’s opposition condemned as a ‘coup attempt against [the] next president.’ Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators were reported to have subsequently amassed in Istanbul and other cities.
Erdogan’s Turkey was identified as one of a number of authoritarian regimes that were part of a ‘democratic recession’, a phenomenon that political sociologist, Larry Diamond, identified back in 2015 (see box: Lexicon for our times): ‘The AKP [the Justice and Development Party, which Erdogan chairs] has gradually entrenched its own political hegemony, extending partisan control over the judiciary and the bureaucracy.’ Of Erdogan, Diamond could already describe then how the leader achieved a ‘stunning and audacious concentration of personal power’ over the party and the country.
Lexicon for our times
Illiberalism – coined by US journalist and writer, Fareed Zakaria, in 1997. ‘Illiberal democracy [...] is where [we see] elected leaders abusing power, depriving people of their rights, hollowing out the essence of classical liberal constitutional government,’ he explains in his most recent book, Age of Revolutions.
Open and closed societies – it was Tony Blair who in 2006 talked of the new divide, not between political ‘left’ and ‘right’, nor East and West, but between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ societies. In speeches at the time, he said that ‘the defining division in countries and between people is increasingly open or closed.’ He continued by asking whether we should ‘embrace the challenge of more open societies or build defences against it? In my judgement, we need an approach that is strong and not scared, that addresses people’s anxieties but does not indulge them.’
Democratic recession – this concept was the brainchild of Larry Diamond, a political sociologist from Stanford, back in 2015. Many backsliding states could be said to have experienced a democratic recession. ‘It is vital that democrats in the established democracies not lose faith,’ he wrote at the time. ‘Democrats have the better set of ideas. Democracy may be receding somewhat in practice, but it is still globally ascendant in peoples’ values and aspirations.’
‘No Kings’ – a slogan from the most recent 2025 protests in the US against Donald Trump’s presidency. ‘We protest to show ourselves that we can,’ said Timothy Snyder, US historian and podcaster, who spoke at the No Kings protest in Philadelphia. ‘We protest to show others that we do not think that all of this is normal. And we also protest as the beginning of other actions.’
Turkey’s illiberalism has only intensified since then, as shown by the arrest of the opposition. ‘Through the extraordinary repression of political opposition, journalists, NGOs [non-governmental organisations] and activists, it’s Erdogan’s way of turning Turkey into a Russian-style autocracy,’ says Gönül Tol, Director of the Turkish Studies Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. Turkey’s government didn’t respond to Global Insight’s request for comment.
‘Start in the streets’
Street protest is an indicator of the absence of effective political opposition. As in Turkey, where the opposition candidate Imamoğlu has been imprisoned, the street is the only place left. ‘The protests have begun at a time when the political scene has been completely decimated and turned into an irrelevance,’ says Aleksov. Szczerbiak agrees. ‘People tend to take to the streets if they can’t achieve political objectives through representatives or administrative channels,’ he says of Poland.
There’s a question, perhaps, as to why 2025 in particular is proving so turbulent. Tol, for one, believes the re-election of Donald Trump as US president has had something to do with Europe’s political mood. ‘Trump’s rhetoric has emboldened the autocrats out there. Imagine a world where Kamala Harris was president, would Erdogan hesitate? I think he would,’ he says. ‘A different leader may not necessarily fundamentally change Erdogan’s policies but they would act as a break.’
Orbán and other leaders like him use the same terminology, press the same emotional buttons and exploit domestic economic insecurities as President Trump does. Orbán has talked of the ‘cleansing wind’ of Trump and of how ‘Leftist’ agendas in the US have been financing ‘socially destructive, pro-migration, anti-family, gender madness around the world’. And President Trump’s policies have re-emphasised the new ‘sides’ individuals are taking – not along the traditional political divide but, as former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair identified in 2006 (see box: Lexicon for our times), between those who believe in an open or closed society.
Of course, Trump is a symptom as well as a cause. Though the reasons behind backsliding are themselves a complex subject, it’s worth noting that so-called ‘elected autocrats’ are still – to varying extents – voted in. Illiberal regimes have their supporters – those who have retreated from the democratic project, perhaps because of cultural factors, but most likely underpinned by economic inequalities. ‘For the socially conservative, they are afraid to lose their way of life, a life they were comfortable with. They feel the EU’s democratic “agenda” is ordering them how to live, telling them what is right or wrong, pushing radical attitudes which, they fear, will lead their children to be strangers to them,’ says Provazník. ‘Integration has happened too fast and expects too much.’
Protests are seen as an important tool for slowing down rule of law backsliding
Tahera Mandviwala
Member, IBA Rule of Law Forum Advisory Board
In his recent book, Age of Revolutions, Fareed Zakaria argues along similar lines, suggesting that the free market economics fostered during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War were not around long enough to establish permanent roots. Those newly opened economies ‘did not have time to develop institutions of liberal democracy’ nor ‘properly embed the protections and freedoms promised by liberalism,’ he says. When the global economy crash-landed after the financial crisis in 2008, many were ‘left to weather the disruptions of market liberalism with no institutional insulation’. And we are still feeling the knock-on effects of that today.
The protests in defence of democracy have become increasingly vocal. ‘There is more consciousness about how authoritarianism affects societies and people, and thus more people are concerned about the erosion in democratic institutions,’ says Mandviwala, who’s also a partner at TDT Legal. Indeed, for her, ‘protests are seen as an important tool for slowing down rule of law backsliding.’ Or as the US lawyer and activist, Florynce Kennedy, once put it, ‘when you want to get to the suites, start in the streets’.
Polly Botsford is a legal and current affairs journalist and can be contacted at Polly@pollybotsford.com